Post by cutupforce on Dec 27, 2008 10:34:57 GMT -5
No, it cannot.
We must first consider, when evaluating the Resurrection Hypothesis (RH) of Jesus, what the event is supposed to mean and the implications it entails. Christians agree that a genuine resurrection is to be distinguished from mere revivification: whereas Jesus truly Resurrected from the dead, Lazarus, on the other hand, merely revived from the dead. A big difference, some would say. Hence, it follows that RH is not fully encapsulated by the following statement:
A. Jesus died and afterward he became alive once again.
Instead, the RH is equivalent to a much more bolder claim:
B. Jesus died and afterward he was transformed into a living supernatural body.
This claim, though, logically entails several other propositions, namely:
i Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE.
ii.Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE.
iii. Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE.
iv. Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE.
v. Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to place at any time after 33 CE.
Those who wish to claim that RH is true must hold that B and propositions (i)-(v) are true. However, those who wish to argue that RH is true must establish that propositions (i)-(v) are probably true. If those propositions cannot be established (either deductively or inductively), then RH cannot be established as being probably true.
Now I will present two arguments for why RH cannot be properly inferred.
Argument 1
Assuming the historicity of the NT, that is, the physical events in question, there are at least two competing hypotheses which may explain those events. The first I call the Divine Being Hypothesis (DBH), which is the Resurrection Hypothesis. It states that Jesus was a Divine Being, or that B and propositions (i) - (v) are true. The second hypothesis I call the Merely Superpowerful Being Hypothesis (MSBH). According to MSBH, although Jesus died and became alive once again, he was only a merely superpowerful being and not a divine being. It could be the case that Jesus possessed extraordinary powers and yet fell short of being divinely powerful.
Thus, my first argument is this: even if we assume the historicity of the New Testament, that is, the physical events in question, there is still the matter of interpreting them: namely, the events of Jesus dying and becoming alive once again, walking through walls, etc. Those events are both consistent with DBH and MSBH, and there is no compelling reason to prefer the former hypothesis over that the latter.
In other words,
A. If we assume the historicity of the NT, that is, the physical events in question, there are at least two competing hypotheses which may explain those events: DBH and MSBH.
B. There is no compelling reason to prefer DBH over MSBH.
C. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to think that DBH is the best hypothesis. (from B)
D. If there is no compelling reason to think that DBH is the best hypothesis, then DBH cannot be properly inferred.
E. DBH cannot be properly inferred (from C, D - via modus ponens)
Argument 2
To infer that DBH is true, or probably true, is analogous to reasoning in the following fallacious way:
Suppose person A and person B know nothing about each other, and one day, A sees B crush a baseball as easily as anyone could crumple up a piece of paper. Despite the incredible nature of the event, it would hardly follow, either deductively or inductively, that B could probably withstand a bolt of lightning, flip over a truck with his pinky, or survive a nuclear blast unscathed. For A to infer that B could probably do those things, on the basis that B was able to crush a baseball easily, would be grossly fallacious.
Similarly, to infer that DBH is probably true on the basis of the historicity of the NT is no less (grossly) fallacious, even assuming the physical events in question. In fact, to make such an inference would be irrational, though that is precisely the kind of inference Christians are asking nonChristians to accept when they argue for the Resurrection of Jesus.
More precisely, the two inferences are analogous in that they commit the fallacy of hasty generalization. From the fact that person P can perform action Q, it does not follow that P can probably perform R, S, or T, when R, S, and T are not very similar to Q.
So,
I. If DBH can only be inferred on the basis of fallacious reasoning, then DBH cannot be properly inferred.
II. DBH can only be inferred on the basis of fallacious reasoning.
III. Therefore, DBH cannot be properly inferred.
We must first consider, when evaluating the Resurrection Hypothesis (RH) of Jesus, what the event is supposed to mean and the implications it entails. Christians agree that a genuine resurrection is to be distinguished from mere revivification: whereas Jesus truly Resurrected from the dead, Lazarus, on the other hand, merely revived from the dead. A big difference, some would say. Hence, it follows that RH is not fully encapsulated by the following statement:
A. Jesus died and afterward he became alive once again.
Instead, the RH is equivalent to a much more bolder claim:
B. Jesus died and afterward he was transformed into a living supernatural body.
This claim, though, logically entails several other propositions, namely:
i Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE.
ii.Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE.
iii. Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE.
iv. Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE.
v. Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to place at any time after 33 CE.
Those who wish to claim that RH is true must hold that B and propositions (i)-(v) are true. However, those who wish to argue that RH is true must establish that propositions (i)-(v) are probably true. If those propositions cannot be established (either deductively or inductively), then RH cannot be established as being probably true.
Now I will present two arguments for why RH cannot be properly inferred.
Argument 1
Assuming the historicity of the NT, that is, the physical events in question, there are at least two competing hypotheses which may explain those events. The first I call the Divine Being Hypothesis (DBH), which is the Resurrection Hypothesis. It states that Jesus was a Divine Being, or that B and propositions (i) - (v) are true. The second hypothesis I call the Merely Superpowerful Being Hypothesis (MSBH). According to MSBH, although Jesus died and became alive once again, he was only a merely superpowerful being and not a divine being. It could be the case that Jesus possessed extraordinary powers and yet fell short of being divinely powerful.
Thus, my first argument is this: even if we assume the historicity of the New Testament, that is, the physical events in question, there is still the matter of interpreting them: namely, the events of Jesus dying and becoming alive once again, walking through walls, etc. Those events are both consistent with DBH and MSBH, and there is no compelling reason to prefer the former hypothesis over that the latter.
In other words,
A. If we assume the historicity of the NT, that is, the physical events in question, there are at least two competing hypotheses which may explain those events: DBH and MSBH.
B. There is no compelling reason to prefer DBH over MSBH.
C. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to think that DBH is the best hypothesis. (from B)
D. If there is no compelling reason to think that DBH is the best hypothesis, then DBH cannot be properly inferred.
E. DBH cannot be properly inferred (from C, D - via modus ponens)
Argument 2
To infer that DBH is true, or probably true, is analogous to reasoning in the following fallacious way:
Suppose person A and person B know nothing about each other, and one day, A sees B crush a baseball as easily as anyone could crumple up a piece of paper. Despite the incredible nature of the event, it would hardly follow, either deductively or inductively, that B could probably withstand a bolt of lightning, flip over a truck with his pinky, or survive a nuclear blast unscathed. For A to infer that B could probably do those things, on the basis that B was able to crush a baseball easily, would be grossly fallacious.
Similarly, to infer that DBH is probably true on the basis of the historicity of the NT is no less (grossly) fallacious, even assuming the physical events in question. In fact, to make such an inference would be irrational, though that is precisely the kind of inference Christians are asking nonChristians to accept when they argue for the Resurrection of Jesus.
More precisely, the two inferences are analogous in that they commit the fallacy of hasty generalization. From the fact that person P can perform action Q, it does not follow that P can probably perform R, S, or T, when R, S, and T are not very similar to Q.
So,
I. If DBH can only be inferred on the basis of fallacious reasoning, then DBH cannot be properly inferred.
II. DBH can only be inferred on the basis of fallacious reasoning.
III. Therefore, DBH cannot be properly inferred.